(DOWNLOAD) "Sensibility and Subjectivity: Levinas' Traumatic Subject/Jausmingumas Ir Subjektyvumas: Levino Trauminis Subjektas (Report)" by Rashmika Pandya " eBook PDF Kindle ePub Free
eBook details
- Title: Sensibility and Subjectivity: Levinas' Traumatic Subject/Jausmingumas Ir Subjektyvumas: Levino Trauminis Subjektas (Report)
- Author : Rashmika Pandya
- Release Date : January 01, 2010
- Genre: Religion & Spirituality,Books,
- Pages : * pages
- Size : 86 KB
Description
Introduction This paper explores Levinas' account of subjectivity in his two major works, Totality and Infinity and Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence. My main aim in this paper is not to disagree with certain validity to Levinas' view of the meaning of ethics but rather with the method he employs to reach this meaning and with the essential asymmetry at the heart of intersubjectivity he endorses. Levinas' "method" navigates within a phenomenological framework. He reworks the two key methodical tools of phenomenology: reduction and intentionality. While Levinas never clearly states that he is working within a phenomenological reduction, his analysis of subjectivity suggests a regression from the subject of enjoyment to the "origin" of subjectivity in the face-to-face encounter with the Other. Intentionality, as "consciousness of " which for Husserl suggested a correlation and reciprocity between terms and entailed a necessary distance or separation between terms, is recast through the notions of affectivity and immediacy. The notion of consciousness as intentional in classical phenomenology was meant 18 Rashmika Pandya Sensibility and subjectivity: Levinas' traumatic subject to describe, not construct, the temporal and inherently dyadic nature of our lived experiences. Levinas recasts intentionality to express experiences that fall outside an "objective intentionality", i.e. experiences that do not fit into the subject/ object dichotomy. While I fully agree that there is room within phenomenology for intentionality other than an intentionality of act or objectivity, I do not agree with what Levinas suggests as an essentially non-intentional relationship--the relationship with the Other. I also take exception to an odd reduction at work within Levinas' later works which aims to get below Husserl's phenomenological and transcendental reductions and Heidegger's 'existential' reduction to reveal a foundational level of the institution of the subject from a passivity/ sensibility void of any kind of comprehension or activity. I argue that the kind of "origin" of subjectivity Levinas aims to reveal is untenable. There is no getting below the intentional relation, other than through an abstract account, and this one can do only in the kind of thinking and theorizing Levinas criticizes in his notions of totalitarianism and economy.